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THE LAW AND THE BRAIN: JUDGING SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE OF INTENT
Erica Beecher-Monas* and Edgar Garcia-Rill, Ph.D.**
INTRODUCTION
As evidentiary gatekeepers, judges must be ready to
evaluate expert testimony about science and the brain. A wide
variety of cases present issues of mental state, many doubtless
with battling experts seeking to testify on these issues. This
poses a dilemma for nonspecialist judges. How is a nonscientist
to judge scientific evidence? How can a nonscientist decide if
testimony about mental state meets the criteria of good science?
This essay offers a general overview of the issue of evaluating
scientific evidence and is aimed at exploring the issues involved,
but not attempting easy answers. Of necessity, this requires
thinking about how science works. It is also an introduction to
the special case of mental capacity, which requires thinking
about how the brain works.
Exercising discretion about expert testimony is a radically
different task today than it used to be. In a series of three
revolutionary cases, the Supreme Court transformed the
jurisprudence of expert admissibility determinations, with
results that are reverberating throughout the judicial system. The
Supreme Court's revolutionary trio explains that judges are the
gatekeepers of the testimony that is heard in their courtrooms,
and that all expert testimony-including expert psychological
testimony-must meet standards of scientific validity. Although
mental health testimony is crucial to criminal jurisprudence as
well as to a range of civil actions, the courts have been
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permitting experts to testify to outmoded and unscientific
notions without any scrutiny of the scientific validity of the
testimony. Failure to engage in a validity analysis is an abuse of
discretion.
The Supreme Court has said that there is no room for junk
science in the courtroom, and that includes testimony about
mental state. Expecting experts to demonstrate the scientific
validity of their theories may challenge the justice system, but it
is the least we should expect from a system that strives for
rationality. The Supreme Court's transformative trio has the
potential to finally dispatch outdated notions about mental state
and to bring decisions of the legal system into synch with
modem understandings of how the brain works.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,' the
Supreme Court laid the groundwork for this transformation by
requiring district court judges to evaluate the scientific validity
and "fit" of expert testimony. In General Electric Co. v. Joiner,
the Court reiterated the Daubert standards, expounded on its
notion of "fit," and explained that, while the standards for
admissibility had changed, the traditional abuse of discretion
standard of review had not.. Finally, in Kumho Tire v.
Carmichael,3 the Court explained that not only do judges have to
evaluate the validity of testimony regarding the traditional
"hard" sciences, but they also must evaluate the validity of
expert testimony based on what the lower courts call the "soft"
sciences, such as engineering and psychology.'
Radical transformations are never painless, and this one has
met with its share of resistance. Certainly, the task of evaluating
expert testimony is a far more complex task after Daubert than it
was before. Difficult as it may be, however, requiring judges to
I. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
3. 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999).
4. See id. at 1175. For cases drawing this distinction between "hard" and "soft"
sciences, see, e.g., Jensen v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1297 (8th Cir. 1997)
(noting that "[tihere is some question as to whether the Daubert analysis should be applied
at all to 'soft' sciences such as psychology"); United States v. DiDomenico, 985 F.2d 1159,
1171 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding "soft" science expertise is less likely to overwhelm the
common sense of the average juror than "hard science" expertise); and United States v.
Scholl, 959 F. Supp. 1189, 1191 (D. Ariz. 1997) (noting that although Daubert's criteria
"are more easily applied to the rigid sciences ... they have also been applied to the soft
sciences such as psychology and psychiatry").
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evaluate the validity of proffered evidence is a vast
improvement over merely counting scientific noses to determine
admissibility.5
Nor is it a task that is beyond the judiciary. Not only did
Daubert itself give the courts some flexible guidelines, but the
Federal Judicial Center published the Reference Manual on
Scientific Evidence in 1994, scores of articles have been written
offering guidance on different aspects of the determination,6 and
a number of exemplary judges have been applying Daubert
routinely and well.
Understanding the probabilistic thinking used by scientists
is the key to sound scientific validity determinations. Appellate
judges who must decide whether trial judges met their
gatekeeping duties need to know how to reason about science.
They also need to know that mental state is not an either-or-
proposition, but a probabilistic statement about the likelihood of
being in control of one's faculties at any given time. This essay
will focus on expert psychological testimony and address two
fundamental issues with which a reviewing court will need to
grapple in order to determine whether expert testimony about
mental state meets the criteria of good science. The first of these
is, how does science work? And the second is, how does the
brain work? This essay hopes to contribute to the understanding
of both.
5. The general acceptance standard, applied by the district court in Daubert, involved
determining whether the expert's conclusions had achieved consensus in the expert's field.
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 571 (S.D. Cal. 1989),
aff'd, 951 F. 2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). For nearly seventy years
before Daubert, the general acceptance standard of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923) was the predominant standard for determining the admissibility of expert
evidence. See Edward W. Kirsch; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Active
Judicial Scrutiny of Scientific Evidence, 50 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 213, 213 (1995).
6. See, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas, A Ray of Light for Judges Blinded by Science:
Triers of Science and Intellectual Due Process, _ GEORGIA L. REV. - (1999);
Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 78 MINN. L.
REV. 1345 (1994); David E. Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the
Commonwealth, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 123 (1996); Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental
Torts, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1, 21-42 (1993); Paul C. Gianelli, "Junk Science": The Criminal
Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105 (1993); Jonathan J. Koehler, Error and
Exaggeration in the Presentation of DNA Evidence at Trial, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 21 (1993);
Michael J. Saks, Implications of the Daubert Test for Forensic Identification Science, I
SHEPARD'S EXPERT & Sci. EVIDENCE Q. 427 (1997).
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I. THE SUPREME COURT'S TRANSFORMATIVE TRIO
A. The Required Analysis
In the first of its three cases on expert testimony, Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,7 the Supreme Court
emphasized the, gatekeeping responsibilities of federal trial
judges. The federal trial judge faced with a proffer of scientific
testimony must first determine whether the expert's testimony is
"scientific knowledge" that will assist the factfinder to
determine a fact in issue.' To qualify as scientific knowledge,
the Supreme Court held, "an inference or assertion must be
derived by the scientific method."9 The further issue of scientific
relevance, or "fit," concerns whether otherwise valid testimony
will actually assist the factfinder.0
The Court's explanation of scientific method was that
scientific knowledge "implies a grounding in the methods and
procedures of science."" Four "general observations" guide the
inquiry.' They are testability, peer review and publication, error
7. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert involved birth defect claims relating to the anti-
nausea drug, Bendectin. Id. Plaintiffs had proffered expert causation testimony, which the
trial and appellate courts ruled inadmissible. See Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 571 (S.D. Cal. 1989), affd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd,
509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Supreme Court reversed, categorically dispatching the general
acceptance test used by the lower courts in their determinations, finding it to be a "standard
absent from and incompatible with the Federal Rules of Evidence." Daubert, 509 U.S. at
590. Instead, the Court ruled, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires a court to examine
proffered expert testimony to determine "whether the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid," and "whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue." l On remand, Judge Kozinski
once more found the expert testimony inadmissible. Daubert, 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
One of the Supreme Court's most vocal critics, Judge Kozinski complained that "though
we are largely untrained in science and certainly no match for any of the witnesses whose
testimony we are reviewing, it is our responsibility to determine whether those experts'
proposed testimony amounts to 'scientific knowledge,' constitutes 'good science,' and was
'derived by scientific method."' Id. at 1316. This essay attempts to aid judges in meeting
that responsibility by shedding light on how science works in the context of what we know
about the workings of the brain. "
8. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
9. See id. at 589.
10. See id. at 591.
11. Id. at 590.
12. See id. at 594 (characterizing the inquiry as a "flexible one").
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rate, and general acceptance. These "flexible guidelines" ''
incorporate not only the Supreme Court's notion of the scientific
method, but also its assessment of the importance to scientists of
feedback from their peers. In setting out its standards for
evaluating scientific validity, the Court relied heavily on the
teachings of Sir Karl Popper, an eminent philosopher of
science. The goal of the Daubert inquiry, as the Court later
explained in Kumho Tire, was to evaluate expert testimony by
the standards experts themselves use to critique each other's
work. 5
Although the Court intended to focus the trial courts on the
validity of the expert's techniques and methodology and away
from the expert's conclusions, that does not mean that the trial
judge could ignore the expert's conclusions.'7 Rather, the trial
court must examine the expert's methodology and techniques for
consistency with the expert's conclusions and with the facts of
the case at hand.'" Conclusions and methodology, the Court
pointed out in Joiner v. General Electric Co., are not entirely
distinct from one another, and there must be a valid connection
between them. 9
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the required
analysis is not limited to the confines of traditional laboratory
science. In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael," the Court explained
13. See id.
14. See id. at 593 (citing Popper).
15. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999).
16. Initially, the Supreme Court in Daubert recognized that the relevance of expert
testimony depends upon whether the proffered testimony will resolve issues presented in
the legal dispute before the court. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. The role of the court,
noted the majority, is to resolve factual disputes, some of which may involve contested
scientific evidence. See id. The key question here is whether the proposed testimony is
based on data that "fits," or is validly connected to, the facts of the case. See id.
17. See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997).
18. See id. This, the Court explained, is the issue of "fit." See id.
19. See id.
20. 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999). Kumho Tire was a products liability action brought against
a tire manufacturer and tire distributor by a plaintiff injured when a tire on the car he was
driving blew out and the car overturned. Id. at 1167. The proffered expert was a tire failure
analyst who proposed to testify that a defect in the tire's design or manufacture caused the
blowout. Id. The trial court granted the defense motion to exclude on the basis of Federal
Rule of Evidence 702. Id. After reconsidering the matter, the trial court agreed with the
plaintiffs that Daubert should be applied flexibly, but still found the expert's testimony
unreliable. Id. at 1173. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, reviewing de novo, and found that
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
that the basic gatekeeping obligation applies not only to
"scientific'.' testimony, but to all expert testimony.2' Technical
or other specialized knowledge also falls within the purview of
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 along with scientific knowledge;
and it must similarly meet a standard of evidentiary reliability.2
The Court explained that the language of rule 702 makes no
distinction between "scientific" knowledge and "technical" or
"other specialized knowledge." 3 Moreover, the rationale
underlying Daubert's gatekeeping reuirement is that the
expert's opinion have a reliable basis. Further, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to draw a distinction between
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.25 Thus,
Daubert's general principles apply to all expert testimony. 6
Emphasizing the flexible nature of the Daubert inquiry, the
Supreme Court explained that not all four factors necessarily
apply even in the traditional laboratory sciences.27 For example,
publication and peer review may be absent if other scientists
were previously uninterested in the topic.2" That does not make
the witness's testimony unreliable. And just because the general
acceptance factor can be met does not necessarily mean that the
testimony is reliable, where, for example, the entire discipline
lacks reliability." Nor is there any logical reason to exempt
the tire expert's testimony lay outside the scope of Daubert. Carmichael v. Samyang Tire.
Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1435 (1997). The Supreme Court reversed. See Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmrichael, 119 S. Ct. 1171 (1999).






27. In the years following Daubert. a number of courts were circumventing their
gatekeeping responsibilities by drawing a distinction between "hard" sciences, such as
physics and medical research, and "soft" sciences such as psychology, engineering, and
most criminal identification evidence (such as handwriting analysis). See Erica Beecher-
Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evidence, 71
TEMPLE L. REV. 55, 63-67 (1998). Some courts, on the other hand, drew no such
distinction, and applied Daubert principles to all expert testimony. See, e.g., United States
v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the general requirements of
Daubert apply to all specialized knowledge). This split in the circuits. was the impetus
behind granting certiorari in the Kumho Tire case. See Kumho Tire, 119 S. Ct. at 1173.
28. Kumho Tire, 119 S. Ct. at 1173.
29. Id. at 1175 (giving the examples of astrology and necromancy).
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technical or experience-based testimony from questions about its
error rate and methodology. 0 Understanding the methodology,
requiring the existence and maintenance of standards controlling
the, technique's operation, and examining how often a given
procedure yields mistaken results, are crucial to evaluating an
expert's conclusions. Unless standards are maintained and
observed for a given technique, the absence of quality control
will make a reliability assessment'impossible. The objective of
the Daubert analysis is to ensure the reliability and relevance of
expert testimony and to be certain that an' expert employs the
same professional standards of intellectual rigor in the
courtroom as is expected in the practice of the relevant field.3 In
sum, the Court concluded, "a trial court should consider the
specific factors identified in Daubert where the are reasonable
measures of the reliability of expert testimony.~2
B. The Standard of Review
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Joiner to resolve a
raging debate among the circuits over the proper standard of
review. The appellate court had rejected the trial court's
scientific validity analysis of proffered cancer causation
testimony, reversing the district court's exclusion.33 While the
appellate court claimed to be using an abuse of discretion
standard in* reviewing the district court's admissibility
determination, it applied the standard in a "particularly
stringent" manner because of the Federal Rules' preference for
admissibility.' The Supreme Court reversed, explaining that the
traditional abuse of discretion standard of review applied even to
scientific validity determinations. The Supreme Court
characterized the appellate court's review as "overly stringent"
and as failing to "give the trial court the deference that is the




33. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 140 (1997).
34. Joiner v. General Electric Co., 78 F.3d 524, 529 (1 lthCir. 1996).
35. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 143.
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Traditionally, the trial court is given wide latitude on
evidentiary determinations and appellate courts will review only
for abuse of discretion. 6 Daubert mandated a validity
determination, but was silent on the standard of review. Most
jurisdictions applied the abuse of discretion standard to the
Daubert analysis. At least one court, however, had applied a
heightened abuse standard, revisiting the trial court's decision,
though giving some deference to its determination. Some
courts used a two-step standard of review, in which the
reviewing court undertook de novo review to determine whether
the trial court properly followed the Daubert framework,
followed by review of its admissibility determination for abuse
of discretion.39
In addition, in Kumho Tire, the Court further explained the
abuse of discretion standard of review it had previously
addressed in Joiner.40 Emphasizing the need for "latitude in
deciding how to test an expert's reliability," the Court explained
that the abuse of discretion standard of review applies "as much
to the trial court's decisions about how to determine reliability
as to its ultimate conclusion.' Whether, and how, to apply
Daubert's specific factors is a question left to the discretion of
the trial judge.42
Of course, this discretion must not be abused, and courts do
not have discretion to ignore Daubert where it applies. Thus, the
court abuses its discretion when it does not engage in a validity
36. United States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 1996).
37. See, e.g., McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1042 (2d Cir. 1995)
("manifestly erroneous" standard); Government of Virgin Islands v. Sanes, 57 F.3d 338,
341 (3d Cir. 1995); (abuse of discretion); Benedi v. MacNeil-P.P.C, Inc., 66 F.3d 1378,
1384 (4th Cir. 1995) (" Daubert clearly vests the district courts with discretion"); Pedraza
v. Jones, 71 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1995); Pestel v. Vcrmeer Mfg. Co., 64 F.3d 382, 384-
85 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1342 (7th Cir. 1996). See also G.
Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its
Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 1028 (1996) ("almost all of the cases say the
standard is broad or deferential, it is a clearly erroneous standard, it looks for manifest or
clear abuse of discretion" ).
38. See, e.g.. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 763-65 (3d Cir. 1994).
39. United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1342 (7th Cir. 1996). But see Hoult v. Hoult,
57 F.3d 1, 5 (Ist Cir. 1995) (declining to "shackle the district court with a mandatory and
explicit reliability analysis").
40. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1176 (1999).
41. Id.
42. Id.
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analysis or when the validity analysis it does engage in is not
soundly reasoned. For example, in Kumho Tire, the district court
had made the required Daubert inquiry and, when it found that
the testimony would not meet the criteria of good science,
excluded the testimony. 3  However, because the expert
testimony at issue was engineering testimony about tire failure,
the Eleventh Circuit reversed, reviewing the district court's
decision de novo, finding that "a Daubert analysis applies only
where an expert relies on the application of scientific ,rinciples,
rather than on skill- or experience-based observation.'
The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that rule 702 makes
no relevant distinction between "scientific" knowledge and
"technical" or "other specialized knowledge." 45 Daubert
applies to expert testimony, period. Reviewing the district
court's Daubert inquiry, the Supreme Court found its
46determination was a reasonable one.
Accordingly, the required standard by which all expert
testimony-whether it concerns laboratory science, engineering,
or psychology-must be judged is its scientific validity and
relevance. In order to decide whether expert testimony can meet
this standard, judges must have some understanding of how
science works to assess whether the testifying expert has met the
scientific standards of intellectual rigor. 7 Without knowing what
those standards are, rational validity decisions are unlikely.
To meet their gatekeeping duties, judges must have an
overall grasp of the frame of reference used by scientists.
Although an education in science is not required, understanding
the context in which scientific argument evolves is crucial.
Context is inseparable from argument, and understanding the
paradigm shift that has occurred in modern science is
imperative.
43. See id. at 1173.
44. Id. (quotations omitted).
45. Id. at 1174.
46. Id. at 1177. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's
determination that the expert engineering testimony at issue "fell outside the range where
experts might reasonably differ." Id.
47. Id.
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H. How DOES SCIENCE WORK?
The Daubert Court's four flexible guidelines rely heavily
for their genesis on the philosophy of science articulated by Sir
Karl Popper. Thus, to understand how scientists see the world,
and to judge whether their work meets the required standards of
intellectual rigor, as well as to judge whether the Supreme Court
got it right, it is helpful to understand something of Sir Karl's
philosophy of science. Before we can address Popper's
philosophy of science, however, we need to place his thoughts in
historical context.
A. Newton's Laws and Determinism
For the last four hundred years, since the birth of modem
physics, the attitude of scientists has been that everything could
ultimately be explained in a scientific manner, that everything
had a cause, and that, if somehow enough of the details could be
known, everything could be explained. This is the essence of
"reductionism." This idea arose from the description of Sir
Isaac Newton's laws relating to force and acceleration, basically
trajectories, which became the "laws of nature." These laws
implied that, once the initial conditions are known, it is possible
to calculate what would happen next and also what happened
before. These laws were "deterministic" in that the past could
dictate the future.4' Everything was "fated" to happen. For
example, factors A plus B plus C were equal to process X, and
X, of course, was equal to factors A plus B plus C. That is, the
equation ran in both directions across the equals sign. This
introduced two conditions, causality and the reversibility of
time. In terms of causality, the laws of motion boiled down to
the collision of particles (which changed the direction or degree
of motion of other particles). The Newtonian concept of cause
stated that because the collision could be expressed in
mathematical terms, so could the cause. The concept of cause
was reduced to a mechanical event, which could then be
expressed as a mathematical formula.49
48. See ILYA PRIGOGINE, THE END OF CERTAINTY: TIME, CHAOS AND THE NEW LAWS
OF NATURE 110 (1997).
49. For more on the reversibility of time, see Ilya Prigogine's book on the "arrow of
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Science was therefore thought to be about causes, not
chance. Classical science emphasized order and stability. These
"laws" also implied that, given enough information, if enough
factors ,were considered, every situation or state could be
calculated with certainty. Newtonian determinism was the
foundation for much scientific-and legal-thinking up until the
early part of this century. But it is a limited vision, and can only
take us so far. As a result, it has been replaced by a new
understanding of how things work.
Now, in contrast, modem scientists see fluctuations,
instability, multiple choices, and limited predictability at all
levels of observation. Kant tried to make causation "a priori
valid" through the principle of induction. But every form of
inductive logic leads to a "probable logic," and infinite regress.
Then there is deductive reasoning, the type that produces firmly
delineated causal chains. The first paradigm shift in modem
science occurred when the uncertainty principle of Heisenberg
and quantum physics led to the abandonment of certainty as a
derivative of deductive reasoning.5  Causality became
"probable" rather than determined. Modem concepts of
causation have been modified accordingly to allow for
probability. If causality is a matter of theory, and if theories are
modified over time, then causality is not a simple either/or
proposition. The probability that one event caused another can
be increased or decreased, depending on how well new evidence
fits with the guiding theory, but it cannot be determined with
absolute certainty.
time." See id
50. See PATRICIA SMITH CHURCHLAND, NEUROPHILOSOPHY 248 (1986). Inductive
reasoning requires concluding a general rule from specific instances. Deductive reasoning
uses a general theory to explain specific instances. For a more detailed discussion of
inductive and deductive logic, see Beecher-Monas, supra note 6.
51. The "deterministic" Newtonian physics of trajectories was replaced by quantum
physics, which described the world in terms of wave functions. For example, for a complex
structure like the solar system, Newtonian mechanics implied that if sufficiently accurate
measurements are made at one time, the future behavior of the system could be predicted
fairly accurately. Using quantum mechanics to describe even a simple system like an atom
with a single electron yields a very different result. Precise prediction of future behavior is
impossible because the exact position of the electron cannot be determined accurately.
Only predictions of the probability of various behaviors can be made. This is part of the
first paradigm shift in modem science, from Newtonian physics to quantum mechanics.
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B. Popper's Philosophy of Science
The new paradigm of probabilistic reasoning was instigated
in no small part by the pathbreaking work of Sir Karl Popper, an
eminent philosopher of science in this century. He helped
engineer the shift away from induction towards deduction,
provided one did not expect (scientific) deduction to consist of
absolute certainty. He supported a deductive method of testing,
emphasizing that a hypothesis can only be empirically tested
(but can never be proven to be absolutely true), and can only be
advanced after it has been tested. However, he also emphasized
that there was no such thing as the "scientific method." He
advanced the concept that there is no method of discovering a
scientific theory, that there is no method of ascertaining the
absolute truth of a scientific hypothesis (i.e., no method of
verification), and that there is no method of ascertaining whether
a hypothesis is probable, or probably true.52 The closest he came
to delineating a scientific method, as such, was to propose that,
"rules of scientific procedure must be designed in such a way
that they do not protect any statement in science against
falsification."" It should be stressed here that Popper did not
advocate that there is no way to conduct science. Rather, his
position was that a "scientific method" that has "rules" that
exclude alternate forms of inquiry should not be sanctioned.
That is, Popper was reluctant to draft "rules" for scientific
inquiry lest they hamper scientific evaluation. 4
Popper realized that science is a creative endeavor-the
search for new knowledge. He believed that scientific ideas
should be formulated and tested. Such testing should involve
tests of consistency within the theory, consistency against other
theories and, of course, consistency with experimental data.
Popper promoted the principle of falsifiability: that, whenever
we propose a solution, we ought to try as hard as we can to
overthrow our solution, rather than defend it. Theories, by
surviving these tests, can come closer and closer to being true,
but we only can be definite about the superiority of one theory
52. Karl R. Popper, Realism and the Aim of Science, in POSTSCRIPT TOTHE LOGIC OF
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 6 (W.W. Bartley III ed. 1983).
53. KARL R. POPPER, LOGIC OF SCIENTnFiC DISCOVERY 40 (1959).
54. Id.
THE LAW AND THE BRAIN
over another, not about its absolute truth. Science must continue
to question and criticize all its theories, even those that happen
to be true. We should prefer one theory over another as being "a
closer approximation of the truth." That is, the aim of science is
to achieve better and better explanations.
In addition, Popper believed in diversity in dialogue, which
makes critical argument fruitful. That is, he did not believe in
narrowing the scientist's focus of inquiry, but rather he believed
in the interaction of various scientific disciplines. In fact, he was
concerned that participation of the "scientific expert" would
narrow the accessibility to the debate. He believed in
rationalism, which basically means that to understand the world
we learn by arguing with others, by testing ideas in the public
forum. Thus, a background or education in science should not be
a prerequisite to participating in the argument. The only things
that the partners in an argument must share are the wish to
know, and the readiness to learn from the other fellow by
severely criticizing his views and hearing what he has to say in
return. Popper posited that scientific theories are distinguished
from myths merely in being criticizable, and in being open to
modifications in the light of criticism. He believed that scientific
knowledge is not an especially strict or certain or august kind of
knowledge. Measured by the high standards of scientific
criticism, "scientific knowledge" always remains probabilistic,
although the probabilities are controlled by criticism and
experiment. Probabilities cannot be induced (they can be
"suggested") from observations.
C. Judging the Implications
On the one hand, considering Popper's insistence on the
non-existence of the scientific method, it is puzzling that the
Supreme Court insisted that scientific knowledge, in order to be
valid, had to be derived from the scientific method. In Daubert,
the Court implies that there is a set of rules-a concept that
Popper thought would actually hamper evaluation." On the other
55. The Supreme Court cited Popper for the proposition that testing hypotheses for
falsifiability is the key to distinguishing science from non-science. See Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) ("The criterion of the scientific
status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability") (citing KARL POPPER,
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hand, the Court, by requiring judges to assess the validity of
scientific evidence, is living up to some of the highest standards
of Popperian philosophy. In practice, judges should insist on
falsifiability (ideally, these experts should be ready to provide a
list of weaknesses, implicit assumptions and untested conditions
that apply to their position/conclusion), diversity (expert
witnesses should be expected to provide explanations that the
judges can understand, and to be able to satisfactorily refute or
explain any concerns raised by the judge and/or other witnesses)
and rationalism (we learn by arguing with others, even if we do
not have a degree). All of these conform in general to the test of
validity referred to as "testability" by the Supreme Court."
In practice, however, many scientists strive to prove their
theories correct (not incorrect), will defend them-with evidence
and/or with smoke, and will develop tunnel vision regarding the
alternatives. While non-scientists believe that scientists follow
the principle of falsifiability, in reality many do not. Moreover,
it should be understood that science generally works not by
deduction, but by metaphor. The heart works like a pump, the
brain works like a computer (easy to understand but unrealistic
metaphors). Most theories are based on sets of existing
assumptions that follow some model, a metaphor for the process
being studied. Science is generally done on models: architectural
models, structural models, human models, animal models,
cellular models. Each of these models differs to some degree
with the "actual" process being studied, and all have intrinsic
problems and hidden assumptions. However, these issues do not
necessarily make them useless or unrealistic. There is no reason
to suspect that results will not generalize to conditions not
tested. For example, if an agent causes cancer in rats, it is likely
that it will cause cancer in humans. If we insist on having the
human data, we may never obtain it (after all, it is highly
unethical to carry out such studies on humans). Metaphors are
very useful in validity determinations, but they must be good
CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFiC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed.
1989)).
56. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
57. Although uncontroversial in science, this is an issue many courts misunderstand,
thinking it a more controversial proposition than it really is. For further discussion, see
Beecher-Monas, supra note 6.
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metaphors. They must accommodate the evidence. That is why
it is so important that judges understand how science works, so
that they can adequately judge the validity of the metaphor.
The Supreme Court's reliance on peer review and
publication/general consensus is also problematic. According to
Popper, general consensus could be achieved, but criticism
should always be welcome. This is particularly true in science,
where many questions need to be reexamined in the light of new
technology. Popper believed that once a hypothesis had proved
its mettle, it should not be allowed to drop out without good
reason. That is, the procedure of peer review and publication is
one way to critique existing theories, which then are bolstered
by passing the trial by fire, or are discredited in the literature.
In practice, things are less clear. Many accepted ideas later
are proven erroneous, but only after proponents have defended
them and even protected them by censoring attacks. Conversely,
bodies of evidence are sometimes built around seemingly
diametrically opposed scientific theories, as if the sheer weight
of the piles of articles will prove one theory over another. It is
amazing how, if you are around long enough, the answer closest
to the truth lies somewhere in between the two theories, brought
into the light of day by novel technology or rationale.
It is difficult to relate the Supreme Court's description of
error rate to specific notions of Popper, except to say that the
method used has to be consistent within itself, with other
theories and with the data. However, it must be emphasized that,
regardless of the error rate, there can only be an approximation
to causality, an approximation to the truth, never a causal
relationship. The probabilistic nature of science must be
accepted, because expecting scientists to provide "hard and
fast" answers, conclusive, absolutely certain definitions or
findings is simply unrealistic. Being frustrated at a scientist's
"buts," " ifs," "possibles," and "probables" is not constructive.
What should be assessed is the consistency of the conclusion
with the data, with competing theories, and with the proposed
hypothesis. "
58. This can create an intellectual conundrum, especially when a method expresses its
findings in a statistical format. Recent ideas suggest that the human brain is error-ridden
(even irrational) when interpreting probabilities and percentages. However, when the same
problems are presented in terms of frequencies, human reasoning appears statistically
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Reductionism is losing ground because today's attitude is
becoming more "realistic." That is, reductionism is being
replaced with a vision that correlates more closely to what we
now observe. New theories and ideas include: the concept of
"non-equilibrium;" 9 concepts such as self-organization instead
of determinism; the irreversibility of time instead of its
reversibility; instability instead of stability; chaos instead of
order. These are some examples of the theories that are
replacing reductionist ideas. We now understand the world to be
made of complex systems, rather than the simple, idealized
situations of Newton.
The old Newtonian rules do not apply to complex systems
because complex systems cannot be reduced to equations.
Complex systems can only be considered in a statistical manner
because they are probabilistic, not certain. The more factors
added, the less likely it is that one can predict the ultimate
position or state of an object. Complex systems have a "life of
their own," they are "indeterminate." This is part of the second
paradigm shift in modem science, the shift to complexity theory.
Complexity theory presents a new view of the world that
describes what is going on'around us and what has gone before.
.Granted, Newton, Einstein and a host of other physicists deserve
inestimable credit for their insights in developing concepts that
have essentially built modem society, but, indeterminism
explains how instabilities -and fluctuations can lead to
evolutionary patterns at all levels, from cosmology to chemistry
to biology, from the formation of the universe to the biology of
the brain. The effects of billions of particles, of forces, of
repetitive interactions, generate change, growth, movement,
evolution and patterns. The simple repetitive process of one
atom bumping into anotheri of those two bumping into many
others, leads, not to random activity, but to coherence, to
sound. See Gerd Gigerenzer, Ecological Intelligence, in THE EVOLUTION OF MIND 9-29
(Denise Dellardsa Cummins & Colin Allen eds. 1998).
59. Complexity theory attempts to provide an understanding of complex systems, from
ant colonies to the human brain to economies to human cultures. Complex systems have
many interacting parts, which can shape themselves into highly organized patterns and are
constantly changing. That is, they never seem to settle down to a state of equilibrium and
are thus in "non-equilibrium." For a general description of complexity theory, see M.
MITCHELL WALDROP, COMPLEXITY: THE EMERGING SCIENCE AT THE EDGE OF ORDER
AND CHAOS (1992).
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concerted action, to organization, to a pattern. This is how the
cosmos works, this is how evolution works, and probably how
the brain works. This new science is the science of complexity,
the kind of science needed to analyze and understand the real
world. Complexity theory is the kind of science needed to
analyze the brain, and to give us a new view of human beings.
The brain is the epitome of a complex system, with many
interacting parts (nerve cells), which shape themselves into
highly organized patterns of activity and are in constant "non-
equilibrium." The normal function of the brain, therefore, has
great variety and flexibility, making it difficult to determine the
boundaries of its capacity. Given the complex nature of the
brain, how can we address such concepts as understanding how
to tell right from wrong, being responsible for our actions, and
making moral choices?
III. WHAT WOULD POPPER SAY ABOUT
MENTAL CAPACITY TESTIMONY?
Expert testimony about mental capacity is proffered under
numerous circumstances, in both civil and criminal trials.6° In
criminal trials, especially, expert mental capacity testimony has
become an important issue. It is often crucial to voluntariness of
confessions, 6' competency to stand trial,62  proving the
substantive issue of criminal intent,63 as an affirmative defense,
60. See Ronald J. Rychlak & Joseph F. Rychlak, Mental Health Experts on Trial: Free
Will and Determinism in the Courtroom, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 193, 194 (1997) ("Legal
doctrines such as insanity, diminished capacity, and chemical dependency raise issues
related to the mental health professions." ).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 974 F. Supp. 1198 (C.D. III. 1997) (subjecting
expert testimony regarding coercion and false confessions to Daubert analysis, and finding
it admissible).
62. Competency to stand trial generally requires that the defendant be able to
understand the charges and assist in the defense. See, e.g., United States v. Bruck, 152 F.3d
40 (1st Cir. 1998) (affirming district court's denial of a competency hearing); United States
v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding defendant competent to stand
trial despite uncontroverted testimony regarding defendant's selective memory, structural
brain abnormalities and history of behavioral problems).
63. See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994) (mandating proof of
knowing and intentional violation of a legal duty to meet statutory "willfulness"
requirement); United States v. Skodnek, 896 F. Supp. 60, 62 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding
expert testimony regarding mens rea subject to analysis under rule 702 and admissible).
64. See J. Thomas Sullivan, Psychiatric Defenses in Arkansas Criminal Trials, 48 ARK.
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and at the sentencing stage.65 The common law insanity
defense-a variation of which is available in nearly all
jurisdictions6"-requires proof of the defendant's ability to
distinguish right from wrong or to conform behavior to the
requirements of law.6'
In most criminal trials involving psychological testimony,
the expert testimony will concern whether the defendant was
suffering from a mental illness, such as schizophrenia or manic-
depressive psychosis, or multiple personality disorder.6
Occasionally, social framework evidence will be offered that
describes typical psychological symptoms of a particular group
of people, such as victims of child abuse." Courts, however,
widely ignore the issue of whether mental health testimony has
any scientific validity. 70 Ordinarily, such testimony has crept into
evidence without restriction.7'
From a Popperian perspective, such deference to experts
has little justification. Popper's philosophy rests on the triptych
of falsifiability, diversity, and rationalism. 2 For mental capacity
testimony, this means that testifying mental health experts must
proffer data to support their hypotheses. An opinion as to the
existence and implications of a hypothesized mental state-such
as multiple personality disorder, for example-must be based on
L. REV. 439, 440 (1995). Provocation, duress, and entrapment claims may also involve
psychological testimony. See Christopher Slobogin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal
Trials: To Junk or Not to Junk?, 40WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 7 (1998).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Gigante, 996 F. Supp. 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (expert
testimony regarding competency to be-sentenced met the Daubert standards).
66. In some version, the requirement that defendants know or appreciate 'the
wrongfulness of their acts is the dominant form of excuse in all United States jurisdictions
recognizing the insanity defense. See Sullivan, supra note 64, at 442.
67. This is the Model Penal Code approach, which provides that "[a] person is not
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease
or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." Model Penal Code § 4.01 (1962).
68. See Slobogin, supra note 64, at 7.
69. See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social
Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 560 (1987).
70. See Slobogin, supra note 64. at 27.
71. See id. at I, 17 (observing that mental health experts testifying in insanity cases
"have been able to say virtually anything they want in court, post-Frye, post-Rule 702, and
post-Daubert... [with] the only significant limitation on such opinion ... a prohibition on
ultimate testimony concerning mental state, introduced in the federal system in the wake of
the Hinkley trial in 1984, and even that limitation has had very little practical effect").
72. See supra 53-54 and accompanying text.
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empirical data.73 As a theory, the testimony must be open to
challenge and modification; the idea must be formulated and
tested, and all the available evidence must in some way be
accounted for in the hypothesis, or at least the exceptions and/or
alternatives should be noted and discussed.
The problem for courts is that brain science is an emerging
field. Judges need to be prepared to continually rethink the
issues of mental disorder in light of new data and new
understandings of how complex systems-like the brain-
interact. Courts, as conservative institutions, may resist having
to continually revise their thinking about the evidence. It is
certainly simpler to let experts testify as they always have.
Moreover, accommodating the continual revisions in the way we
understand brain function may revolutionize the criminal justice
system. But accommodating new scientific understandings is
what Popper, sound science, and Daubert demand. Subsequent
scientific developments can discredit even the best factfinding
previously available. 4 Mental state is such an important facet of
our understanding of criminal responsibility that judges need to
be open to the new ideas emerging in the field of brain science.
Much of what mental capacity experts proffer needs to be
questioned. Conclusory subjective statements from an expert are
unacceptable under Daubert. Expert testimony must be backed
by hypotheses and data. A testifying expert must be able to
explain the proffered hypothesis to a nonspecialist. The principle
of diversity insists that scientific ideas have no professional
boundaries. The aim of science is better explanation. Has the
73. See, e.g., Bowen v. State, 911 S.W.2d 555 (Ark. 1995) (opposing experts battled
over whether the mental disorder known as dissociative disorder (or. more commonly, as
multiple personality disorder) existed or not, but the judge apparently never required
empirical support for either hypothesis).
74. A good example of this phenomenon is the way DNA evidence has revolutionized
the criminal justice system. While such evidence has become a powerful prosecutorial tool
in identifying the accused as perpetrator of the offense, it has also had a dramatic impact on
the system by affording previously convicted defendants a means of attacking their
convictions. By successfully arguing that the DNA evidence excludes the defendant, or by
challenging the accuracy of the prosecution's DNA evidence, these defendants have
utilized the emerging technology to challenge their convictions. In 'a recent case, for
example, DNA evidence showed that a man convicted of rape in Georgia sixteen years
earlier could not have been the perpetrator, resulting in the man's release from prison and
the dropping of the rape charges by the prosecuting attorney. See DNA Test Frees
Convicted Rapist 16 Years Later, ARK. DEM. GAZ., June 17, 1999, at 4A.
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expert sought out pertinent data? How well does the hypothesis
explain the available data? What is the error rate of the
methodology? Has the testifying expert accounted for the
opponent's conclusion? If the explanation is well supported and
well reasoned, it meets the standards of scientific validity, even
if it later proves to be wrong. The judge's gatekeeping function
is not to decide the ultimate correctness of the theory, but only
to determine whether it meets the criteria of sound science.
After Kumho Tire, it is clear that all expert testimony must
be subjected to validity analysis before being admitted. Mental
state testimony is traditionally proffered by experts and therefore
logically falls within this purview." Whether the product will
improve as a result depends in large part on the application of
the analysis by the judiciary.76 Although the expert should be
able to provide an understandable explanation about "normal"
mental states as well as "abnormal" ones, in order to know what
questions to ask it would be helpful for judges to have some idea
of how scientists understand the brain to work.
A. How Does the Brain Work?
Two modem ideas are crucial to understanding the
emerging field of brain science: probabilistic thinking and
complexity theory. The probability that one event caused
another changes depending on the available data. Therefore,
causality is at best an approximation rather than a certainty. And
the interactions of complex systems such as the brain are in
constant non-equilibrium, giving its function great variety and
flexibility, making the boundaries of its capacity hard to
determine.
75. But see infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. The problem is that the Supreme
Court's excursions into mental capacity testimony conflict with its Daubert rulings. See
infra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
76. Cf. David L. Faigman, The Evidentiary Status of Social Science Under Daubert: Is
it "Scientific, " "Technical," or "Other Knowledge?", I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 960,
971 (1997) (arguing that social science evidence ought to be subjected to Daubert analysis
as a way of improving such testimony).
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1. The Non-Linear Brain
. Neuroscientists understand that the brain is non-linear at
both the visible level and at the microscopic level. For example,
the membrane potential of a single neuron changes in a non-
linear fashion, as graded synaptic inputs all over its surface
interact to create background noise, complexity arising even in
individual brain cells. The membrane of the neuron has a
threshold that represents a critical point at which action
potentials fire away. The interactions between the membrane
potential and the arriving graded synaptic inputs represent a
complex system in non-equilibrium. The pattern of graded and
action potentials generated by a population of neurons, in turn,
may represent an even more complex system in non-
equilibrium, leading to wavefronts of activity. Wavefronts of
activity are self-organized entities, coherent forms of activity,
ordered patterns emerging from elements in disequilibrium. This
is known as coherence in brain activity, or mental order.77
Is there an appropriate metaphor for such activity? Every
culture has had its characteristic model of how the brain works.
Before the turn of the century, the brain was thought to work
like the most powerful machine of the time, the steam engine.
Then, the intricate anatomical description of nerve fibers
visualized early in this century promoted the idea that the brain
was like one of the newest complex machines, the telephone
exchange. More recently, the brain has been equated to a
computer, because it is seen as working in digital fashion (i.e., 0
or 1, on or off, linear). However, most of the activity of the brain
is analog (i.e., like waveforms with an infinite number of values
along peaks and valleys, nonlinear). Therefore, an appropriate
metaphor appears to be that the brain works like an orchestra.
The various regions of the brain may be likened to the
sections of an orchestra. Each of these areas has its characteristic
types of nerve cells which are in contact with specific nerve
cells in some or all of the other sections of the brain. It is the
simultaneous and sequential activity of the different regions of
the brain that gives rise to the music of our minds, that is, to
thought and action. Nerve cells communicate with each other in
77. This metaphor is explored at length in an upcoming book by one of the authors.
EDGAR GARCIA-RILL, BRAIN MUSIC (forthcoming).
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the form of a Morse code very much like the individual notes
being played by a specific instrument in the orchestra. The
combined efforts of many nerve cells within a region that are
active in unison in a repetitive manner generates a characteristic
brain rhythm. This amalgamated Morse Codelike activity can
be equated to the notes played together by each of the
instruments in a section of the orchestra. When several brain
regions are active simultaneously, they generate frequencies of
activity in harmony with each other, very much in the way the
different sections of the orchestra produce notes-frequencies of
sound-to yield musical harmony, namely a melody. According
to this metaphor, the function of the brain is to generate thought
and movement, just as the function of the orchestra is to
generate music.
2. Mental Disorder
Now that we view the brain as non-linear, probabilistic, at
the transition between equilibrium and non-equilibrium, how are
we to view mental disease?78 Mental disorder is just that-
disorder, or brain activity beyond the normal range of
probabilities. 9 Normally, we have a wide range of options from
78. Mental disease, for the present discussion, is limited to the specific disorders
mentioned above, namely schizophrenia, anxiety disorder, and depression, but not to global
conditions such as mental retardation or diffuse traumatic brain injury. Although mental
retardation and diffuse traumatic brain injury may well fall within the scope of the "mental
disease or defect" for legal purposes, the brain science relating to them is different and
beyond the scope of this article.
79. This is hardly a revolutionary idea. First, it must be understood that there are large
numbers of tests, rating scales and structured interviews used for psychological assessment.
These tests are standardized methods of sampling behaviors in a reliable and valid way.
See, e.g., J.F. Clarkin & S. W. Hunt, Psychological Assessment: Tests and Rating Scales, in
TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 225 (J.A. Talbott et al. eds. 1988). Psychometrics is the name
given to the application of statistical methods to the study of psychological phenomena.
Perhaps the "bible" of psychometric studies of mental disorder is a classic textbook by
H.J. Eynsenck, HANDBOOK OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY (1960). Since then, there has
been a virtual explosion in the design and implementation of more and more specific
psychometric tests. See, e.g., 1. GRANT & K. M. ADAMS, NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSESSMENT OF NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS 654 (1996); G. GROTH-MARNAT,
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 1026 (1997).
Second, psychometrics is used to describe the behavior of a population. Any
population will show a distribution of scores on a test, which is known as a normal
distribution or bell curve. We can describe a bell curve by two figures, the mean (the
arithmetic average of the scores of the population) and the standard deviation (which
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which we choose the more or less optimal path. Critical
judgment can be said to be the capacity to narrow down the
probabilities to a manageable number. Saddled with a mental
disease, the range of probabilities increases. There are too many
options, too many possible directions in which to go, and far too
many of these options appear "logical." In the absence of
critical judgment, it becomes easier to take a "flyer," or to
follow a red herring of logic to its illogical-and in some cases
criminal-fate.
To use a metaphor, imagine sanity as driving down the
proper side of the road, The Road of Life. (Figure 1) Mental
disease sometimes makes you disregard that center line, and
even the side lines, so that you start occasionally driving on the
oncoming lane and on the shoulders, perhaps even in the ditches
on either side of the road, all at breakneck speed. "Normal"
people may deviate slightly from the correct lane, but they will
spend the majority of their driving time centered. In order to
understand mental disorder, we need to know about normal
mental states.
3. Three States
We know that the human brain has three states of activity.
We are awake, asleep, or asleep and dreaming. The region of the
brain that controls these states is deep in the brain, in the
brainstem, in a part of the brain that has been conserved in
evolution. This region is called the Reticular Activating System
(RAS) and controls our sleep-wake rhythms by influencing the
measures the spread of the scores of the population). The bell curve has a convex shape
around the mean, and a concave shape at the two extremes, known as the tails of the
distribution of scores.
Third, a particular individual's score can then be compared to the scores of the
population, falling close to the mean or towards either tail of the bell curve. When an
individual's score lies (usually) more than two standard deviations away from the mean, it
is considered to be (statistically) significantly different from the mean-of the population.
This score can lie on the left or the right tail. That is, psychometric scales will reveal if an
individual's score was outside the normal boundaries of behavior. These scales all measure
continua within which the patients will fall, sometimes falling at one or the other extreme
end of the distribution. Most patients, however, will show some measure of normalcy
(close to the mean) on some tests, while other rating scales will clearly identify behavior
outside the "normal" range of scores; i.e., mental disorder or behavior outside the normal
range of probabilities.
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
wavefronts of activity that travel to higher centers. The RAS
also controls our level of sensory arousal, or how we respond to
the environment. -It controls our basic "fight-or-flight" survival
mechanism. When this region is disturbed or diseased, many
aspects of our behavior are affected for the worse."0
Right now, we are awake (attested by complex,
desynchronized wavefronts of activity induced by the RAS
throughout the cortex, the convoluted outer shell of the brain,
our most sophisticated brain region). A sudden, loud sound will
instantly result in heightened, even more complex activity in the
cortex. At the same time, our bodies will exhibit a startle
response, and assume a "ready" position in order to respond.
Respond in which way? Ready to fight or flee, to attack a prey
or escape a predator. This response is exaggerated in several
psychiatric and neurological disorders, and we will deal with
those consequences below.
If we are tired or bored, we start drifting into drowsiness
and ultimately into sleep. The RAS-influenced cortical
wavefronts of activity become simpler, more synchronized, as
we move into deeper and deeper restful sleep. However, after
about ninety minutes of this, we suddenly shift into a complex
pattern of desynchronized brain activity again.
The wavefronts of activity in the brain look like those in
waking, but we are asleep, Because our brain waves look like
those during waking, this state is known as '.'paradoxical" sleep.
Because our eyes are moving frantically, this state is also known
as "rapid eye movement" (REM) sleep. It is mostly during this
state that we dream. During synchronized sleep, we toss and
turn, but as we move into REM sleep, we stop moving; in fact,
our muscles are paralyzed by our brains. The brain, specifically,
the part of the RAS that controls REM sleep, does not want us to
act out our dreams. Only our eyes are allowed to act them out,
thus the eye movements.
One other important event occurs during REM sleep. When
that part of the RAS controlling REM sleep is pounding away,
blood flow to the frontal lobes decreases.8 The frontal lobes are
80. Edgar Garcia-Rill, Disorders of the Reticular Activating System, 49 MEDICAL
HYPOTHESES 379, 379-87 (1997).
81. See Pierre Maquet et al., Functional Neuroanatomy of Human Rapid-Eye-
Movement Sleep and Dreaming, 383 NATURE 163, 163-66 (1996).
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thought to be the prime regions responsible for critical
judgment. Therefore, when we dream, critical judgment is
lessened, probably by the reduced levels of oxygen in our frontal
lobes. This is perhaps why we accept our dreams so readily, why
we do not question that we are flying, why some accept that
there is a highway through the living room, or why others listen
unquestioningly to a disembodied voice telling them what to do.
Every ninety minutes during sleep, we all suffer from a lack of
critical judgment for variable periods of time, during which we
usually dream from five to forty-five minutes. This particular
state may be a key to understanding abnormal brain function,
although it is obviously not the only key. Is it possible during
waking for the brain to assume a state that is characterized by
decreased blood flow to the frontal lobes, which thereby reduces
critical judgment?
4. Hypofrontality
One of the key developments in the emerging field of brain
science-and one that has the potential to revolutionize criminal
jurisprudence-is the effect of hypofrontality on critical
judgment. The reduction of blood flow to the frontal lobes is
known as hypofrontality, that is, reduced function of the frontal
lobes. Hypofrontality is present in a number of psychiatric and
neurological disorders, but it occurs during waking." For
example, hypofrontality is present in schizophrenia, along with
other symptoms that can be explained by disturbance in the
RAS, such as hallucinations.83
Hallucinations have been proposed to represent REM
intrusion into waking, that is, dreaming while awake. If this is
true, then schizophrenic individuals will experience a seemingly
"real" event (because they know that they are awake), and
accept it unquestioningly (because they are "hypofrontal" and
have decreased critical judgment). Dream content could include
82. See Monte S. Buchsbaum et al., Cerebral Glucography with Positron Tomography,
39 ARCH. GEN. PSYCH. 251, 251-59 (1982).
83. See Daniel R. Weinberger et al., Physiologic Dysfunction of Dorsolateral
Prefrontal Cortex in Schizophrenia, 43 ARCH. GEN. PSYCH. 114, 114-24 (1986).
84. See D.C. Dement, Studies on the Effects of Rem Deprivation in Humans and in
Animals, 43 RES. PUBL. ASSOC. RES. NORM. MENT. DIS. 456,456-63 (1967).
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commands from a disembodied voice, which, after all, "must"
be the voice of God or other authority directing some form of
atonement or punishment on unsuspecting victims, including
total strangers.
What else can happen if this part of the RAS is overactive?
We know that the startle response is exaggerated in
schizophrenia. A sudden, loud sound may cause an exaggerated
startle response, an excessive "fight-or-flight" reaction out of
proportion to the stimulus. That individual could strike out
violently (again, uncritically) at the perceived threat, or escape
into a catatonic stupor, caused by too much "fight" or too much
"flight."
We know that hypofrontality and overactivity in the part of
the RAS controlling REM sleep is present to some extent and to
varying degrees in such disorders as anxiety disorder
(particularly in posttraumatic stress disorder), depression and
manic-depression (now referred to as bipolar disorder).86 In
addition, persons. with Parkinson's Disease and Huntington's
Disease, and some with Attention Deficit Disorder appear to be
hypofrontal. 87 A recent study using brain-imaging techniques
found that, compared to non-violent individuals, psychopaths
showed lowered blood flow in portions of the frontal lobes
during processing of emotional words." Another study, using a
similar brain imaging technique, found reduced metabolism in
the frontal lobes (and other areas of the brain) in murderers
pleading guilty by reason of insanity compared to normal
controls. 9
Obviously, the fact that these disorders all share
disturbances in the RAS to some extent, while differing widely
in their symptomatology, means that other parts of the brain are
also disturbed in various ways. These findings also suggest that
hypofrontality is not specific to psychotic behavior or to
violence, so that brain imaging techniques will not be able to
85. See Garcia-Rill, supra note 80, at 381.
86. See id, at 382.
87. See id. at 384.
88. See Joanne Intrator et al., A Brain Imaging (Single Photon Emission Computerized
Tomography ) Study of Semantic and Affective Processing in Psychopaths, 42 BIOLOGICAL
PSYCHIATRY 96-103 (1997).
89. See Adrian Raine et al., Brain Abnormalities in Murderers Indicated by Positron
Emission Tomography, 42 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 495-508 (1997).
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differentiate between, for example, (a) a depressive patient; (b) a
wheelchair-bound Parkinson's Disease patient; or (c) a
psychopath. It should be noted that critical judgment may be
influenced by factors other than hypofrontality, but we simply
do not have enough information about them. While we do know
that critical judgment is the province of the frontal lobes, we do
not know if all critical judgment is exercised by the frontal
lobes, adding uncertainty even in the light of so much
knowledge about the brain.
5. The Road of Life
Are these unfortunate-mentally ill-individuals always
hypofrontal? Obviously not, since their behavior much or some
of the time appears to be within normal boundaries. Just as
normal individuals are not always happy or sad, many of these
individuals are not always functioning abnormally. As we go
down the Road of Life, some of us (normal individuals) will stay
more or less in the right lane, occasionally exceeding the speed
limit, sometimes skirting the center line, sometimes even the
side line. A psychotic individual, perhaps with sociopathic
tendencies, will veer from the right lane into the left, oncoming
lane when a car approaches in the opposite direction, all at
breakneck speed, perhaps even doing so when the oncoming car
is merely a hallucination. However, at some point in time, that
individual will return to the right lane. (See Figure 1).
People with depression may lose so much critical judgment
that. the survival instinct is erased, that is, they are suicidal.
These individuals may go from the right lane onto the ditch on
the right, even for long periods of time during that depressive
(hypofrontal) episode. The bipolar individual may be veering
wildly from the right ditch then quickly to the left ditch. For
example, bipolar mothers are often overwhelmed by the
prospect of caring for their own children, that is, their disease is
serious enough to erase the mothering instinct.
However, all of these individuals will, at some point or
other, find themselves in the right lane. At such an instant in
time, for example, in a courtroom, such individuals may act
within normal boundaries and appear competent to stand trial.
They will be able to identify the judge, the defense attorney,
themselves, and understand the charge. However, that does not
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mean that the manner in which the current criminal justice
system treats such people makes sense in light of their condition.
For example, will they be able to stay in the right lane
throughout the trial to assist in their defense? Questionable.
Were they on the wrong side of the road when the crime was
committed? Highly likely. Will they find themselves on the
wrong side of the road in the future? Highly likely, if they
remain without treatment. Are they in full command of their
faculties? Sometimes. Should they be punished for a "crime"
they now know was wrong? Probably not; perhaps they should
be treated. What if there is no effective treatment? How should
the criminal justice system treat these individuals?
B. Mental Capacity in the Courts
So, how do the courts deal with issues related to
abnormality in the most complex structure on the planet? How
can we analyze a problem in a system we are just beginning to
understand? The Supreme Court has required a Daubert analysis
of all expert testimony. 9° Yet the testimony in two important
Supreme Court cases involving mental capacity opinions that are
still being followed today could not withstand a Daubert
analysis. In the first of these opinions, Moore v. Duckworth,9 the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of proving sanity by
the testimony of lay witnesses. 9 That is the equivalent of
90. See Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999).
91. 443 U.S. 713 (1979).
92. Id. at 714 (rejecting the defendant's contention that there was insufficient evidence
of sanity where the prosecution relied solely on lay witness testimony to prove sanity, the
defense had presented expert testimony to the contrary, and the prosecution had proffered
no expert rebuttal testimony). The Court found no constitutional infirmity since Indiana
law permitted sanity to be proved by either expert or lay testimony. Id. at 715. The open
question now is whether there is constitutional infirmity in convicting a defendant based on
evidence that could not meet the criteria for admissibility. See also Davasher v. State, 823
S.W.2d 863, 866 (Ark. 1992), where a paranoid schizophrenic patient ."tortured by
religious delusions"-who had not been taking his medication-was convicted of killing
his former girlfriend and her mother despite uncontroverted testimony by the state
psychiatrist that the defendant lacked the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. The court's rationale was
that although the Arkansas criminal code permits a judge to acquit on the grounds of
mental disease or defect, it does not require acquittal. Id at 87 1. Rather than focusing on the
element of intent, which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, the
Arkansas Supreme Court chose instead to focus on mental disease or defect which the
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permitting lung cancer causation testimony by lay witnesses, a
result that is clearly antagonistic to Daubert. Both lungs and
brain are physical organs. Mental disease has a physical basis,
even though we do not yet know exactly how it works.
Diagnosis of mental disease, like that of physical disease, is the
basis of specialized knowledge, and that is the province of
experts.
Even more egregious than permitting lay witnesses to
testify about disease is the Supreme Court's position on
admissibility of future dangerousness testimony. In Barefoot v.
Estelle,9' the Supreme Court upheld mental capacity testimony
about future dangerousness that flies in the face of scientific
evidence. At issue was the constitutionality of permitting
psychiatrists to testify about the defendant's future behavior,
given that such predictions are wrong two out of three times. No
one (including psychiatrists) can predict with any degree of
reliability that an individual will commit other crimes in the
future.94 Moreover, the psychiatrists in question had never
examined the defendant personally. 9
defense must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, a burden that the court found the
defense had not met. Id. at 871. Although the court recognized the persuasiveness of the
unrefuted expert testimony that the defendant was not legally responsible for his acts at the
time of the offense, it nonetheless found that the jury was not bound -to accept the expert
testimony as conclusive. Id. Contrast this result with that in the civil case Joiner, where the
Supreme Court held that no reasonable jury could find that the element of causation had
been established by the admissible expert testimony. See General Electric Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136 (1997). If causation cannot be established by a preponderance absent
admissible expert .testimony, it is difficult to see how intent of a paranoid schizophrenic can
be established beyond a reasonable doubt in the face of unrefuted testimony to the contrary.
Even under the Arkansas court's rationale, moreover (that the defense had the burden of
proving mental disease by a preponderance), its ruling that the defense had not met its
burden is clearly wrong. The expert testimony on the issue was uncontroverted, so the jury
had no other testimony on that issue to weigh. The reason experts are permitted to testify at
all is that they can explain matters outside the jury's experience. While the jury is
competent to decide among competing strands of evidence, it is not entitled to reach a
decision contrary to the admissible expert testimony-at least in a civil case. Cf. Joiner,
522 U.S. at 141. Daubert requires a court to admit only. reliable testimony. Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590-91. Lay testimony on a subject of
scientific knowledge is inadmissible in a civil court. See Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 119 S.
Ct. 1167 (1999). How then can it be admissible in a criminal case where the stakes are so
much higher?
93. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
94. Unfortunately, even in states that have established a Daubert-type admissibility
standard, such as Texas, lay testimony may still be admissible to with respect to future
dangerousness. See, e.g., East v. State, 702 S.W.2d 606, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en
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At the sentencing proceeding in Barefoot, two psychiatrists
testified that the defendant "would probably commit future acts
of violence and represent a continuing threat to society." 9 The
Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of such testimony,
remarking that disallowing it would be like "disinvent[ing] the
wheel." Because courts had traditionally admitted such
testimony, the Court refused to overturn its precedent. However,
as Justice Holmes pointed out nearly a century before, just
because it has always been done this way is a poor reason to
continue. That is especially true of issues relating to science,
which is continually revising our understanding of how things
work.
The Court acknowledged the American Psychiatric
Association's opposition to future dangerousness testimony
because of its extreme unreliability. Nonetheless, it found that
because the Association did not claim that psychiatrists were
always wrong with respect to future dangerousness
predictions--only that they were wrong more often than not-it
would not exclude such testimony. In light of Daubert's
emphasis on acceptable error rates, however, Barefoot's
decision is highly questionable.
It is also highly debatable from aPopper an viewpoint. We
live in a world of probabilities, using a complex non-linear brain
in a complex society. First, the normal boundaries of behavior
are quite wide, especially because the brain functions at a
transition between equilibrium and non-equilibrium. Second, the
factors influencing behavior are complex and can only be
considered probabilistic because there is never just one "cause."
Any idea that we can control these factors leads at best to
Orwellian fantasies. Third, the equilibrium of the brain can be
radically altered by seemingly inconsequential stimuli.
Science is not a magic bullet; there is no method for
unerring diagnosis, no recording of a brain wave that "proves"
banc) (finding lay witness testimony on future dangerousness admissible). While it appears
logical that admission of expert testimony that would not withstand a Daubert analysis has
due process implications, the Court has not yet so held. A discussion of this issue is beyond
the scope of this article.
95. See id. at 899.
96. Id. at 884.
97. Id. at 896.
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this person is insane, or the like. We cannot (and will not be able
to) predict what thought will enter someone's mind, for there are
so many factors leading to that thought. Interactions of complex
systems simply cannot be predicted far in advance with any
accuracy. We cannot predict or force the occurrence of an idea
any more than we can predict next week's weather. We cannot
predict when a diseased brain will overreact violently to an
inconsequential stimulus. We do know that one predictor of
violence is a repetitive pattern of previous violent behavior. The
most that can be said, however, is that a repetitive pattern of
violent behavior increases the probability that future violence
will occur.98 Moreover, even among mentally ill populations
with a history of past violence, experts are wrong in their
predictions more often than they are right.99 However, we also
know that people whose mental illness is treated do not exhibit
violent behavior more frequently than people without a history
of mental illness.
The most that can be said about future dangerousness is a
statement about the probability of a person with certain physical
symptoms manifesting behavior outside the normal range. That
is not to say that diagnosis of mental disorder is unfeasible. We
can assess the probability that an individual has a mental
disorder. Diagnoses of psychosis, schizophrenia, and the like are
a matter of assessing these probabilities. There is little doubt that
mental disorders like post-traumatic stress disorder and multiple
personality disorder do exist, and that certain individuals do
show all or most of the symptoms accompanying these
disorders.
The issue in Barefoot was constitutional: could the state
sentence the defendant to death based on scientifically
questionable testimony? The Supreme Court decided that it
could. The Supreme Court distinguished its decision in Barefoot
from scientific evidence cases in which testimony about future
dangerousness had been disallowed by explaining that Barefoot
sought a constitutional rule barring an entire category of expert
testimony.'t° The Court was "not persuaded that such testimonyis almost entirely unreliable" and so found that the adversary
98. See id. at 922 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
99. See id. at 920.
100. Id. at 899.
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system would be competent to take account of its
shortcomings.'' Therefore, the Court found "no constitutional
barrier to applying the ordinary rules of evidence governing the
use of expert testimony.",o
The ordinary rules of evidence governing the use of expert
testimony have changed since Barefoot, however, and it is the
Supreme Court's doing. Now the ordinary rules of evidence
require that evidence be reliable in order to be admissible.
Reliability in the context of scientific evidence requires
scientific validity. It is doubtful that testimony about future
dangerousness could withstand Daubert analysis. The point is
not that Daubert overrules Barefoot. It does not. Rather, the
point is that the conceptual underpinnings of Daubert 'are
anathema to the result in Barefoot. Yet, the rule announced in
Barefoot continues to be used without any attempt at subjecting
it to a Daubert analysis.03 The testimony in Barefoot certainly
never received any such analysis, and predictions about future
dangerousness were acknowledged to be wrong two out of three
times. Moreover, given what we know about complex systems
such as the brain and their interaction with other complex
systems such as the world we live' in, predicting future
interactions can amount to little more than speculation.
Furthermore, mental disorder is treatable. Many disorders
can, with treatment, bring behavior within the .wide 'range of
normal behavior. The brain is a physical organ and its function'
can be chemically altered. How such treatment will affect future
behavior is, again, impossible to predict. We do know, however,
that changing brain chemistry can Widen the intervals between
the times a person may end up in the ditches on the road of life.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 904.
103. Of course, most criminal cases come before state courts, and a state court is not
bound to follow Daubert, even if the state has adopted-as most have-rules of evidence
modeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 27, at 79.
Thus, for example, although the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explicitly recognized in
Jordan v. Texas, 928 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), that Daubert and the
scientific validity standard it had adopted in Kelly v. Texas, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1992), were substantially identical, Texas courts continue to allow testimony
regarding future dangerousness without subjecting it to a strict Daubert analysis. See, e.g.,
Nenno v. Texas, 970 S.W.2d 549, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (holding that a Daubert
analysis applies with "less rigor" to the "social sciences or fields that are based primarily
upon experience and training as opposed to the scientific method").
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Although there is a great deal about the brain and mental
states that we do not understand, there are some things that
scientists do know. The problem is that what is known is
inconsistent with evidence the Supreme Court held admissible, in
two prominent cases on mental capacity. Lower courts cannot
blindly accept pre-Daubert approved notions of expertise.
Subjecting the lay and expert testimony in Duckworth and
Barefoot to a Daubert analysis would reveal their flaws and
render the testimony used inadmissible.
CONCLUSION
Two things become clear from juxtaposing Popperian
precepts and what is known about the brain with the way courts
are handling mental capacity testimony. First, judges must insist
on the presentation of supporting data and coherent explanations
of expert hypotheses. The probability that one event caused
another increases or decreases depending on what evidence is
available to support the theory. In order to assess the validity of
the hypothesis, judges must require experts to present data and
explain the way the hypotheses were tested.
Second, the Supreme Court needs to reconcile its
conflicting jurisprudence on mental capacity testimony. Mental
capacity is not a proper subject for lay testimony any more than
cancer causation or tire failure. Nor does a methodology that
frequently fails-because predicting complex interactions in a
complex world is not feasible- pass gatekeeping muster. How
it can be constitutional. in a criminal case involving deprivation
of life or liberty to admit expert testimony that could not pass
gatekeeping muster in a civil suit is a question the Supreme
Court has yet to resolve.
The brain is a complex system-'-non-linear, probabilistic,
at the transition between equilibrium and non-equilibrium.
Sanity is not an all-or-nothing proposition; it is a probablistic
statement. Mental disorder is brain activity beyond the normal
range of probabilities. However, a mentally ill individual will
transition in and out of the normal range. At trial, the defendant
may be driving on the right side of the road, but could have
recently been in the ditch and will probably, if left untreated,
return to the ditch. The experts should be testifying about those
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probabilities and offer reasoned arguments for their conclusions.
By realizing that science is about probabilities rather than
causes, and by recognizing that an apt metaphor for mental state
is the road of life, so that sanity is not an all or nothing issue, but
a probabilistic statement, even a generalist judge can be better
prepared to evaluate such testimony.
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